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We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features 
inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs and workers, and also intra-group inequality 
within each of those two groups. Individuals in the economy are heterogeneous with respect 
to their entrepreneurial ability, and firms run by more able entrepreneurs have a higher 
productivity level and make higher profits. There is rent-sharing at the firm level due to fair 
wage preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in 
equilibrium in order to elicit their workers’ full effort. We show that in this framework 
international trade leads to a self-selection of the best firms into export status, and aggregate 
welfare increases if this selection effect is sufficiently strong. Gains from trade are 
accompanied by larger inequality along multiple dimensions: Involuntary unemployment and 
income inequality between entrepreneurs and workers increase, and so does inequality within 
these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients. 
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The recent literature on international trade with ﬁrm heterogeneity has substantially im-
proved our understanding of the eﬀects that market integration has on national economies.1
In this paper, we use it as the starting point for the re-assessment of a classic question in
international economics: the impact of economic integration on the distribution of income
within countries. We provide an integrated framework that features income inequality
along multiple dimensions, and that is yet simple enough to allow the comprehensive
analysis of the eﬀects of international trade. In addition to income inequality between
ability (or skill) groups, which has been the traditional concern of trade economists at
least since the days of Stolper and Samuelson, we also look at income inequality within
the same ability group. There is no doubt that in many countries intra-group inequality
is an important part of overall inequality, and that it has increased substantially over the
past decades (Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006; Autor, Katz and Kear-
ney, 2008). The observed increase in intra-group inequality has been simultaneous to the
widely documented surge in intermediate goods trade, and it is therefore important to
treat this co-movement as an integral part of the overall relationship between economic
integration and income distribution.2
When it comes to modelling intra-group wage inequality, two diﬀerent approaches
1The most widely used theoretical framework is due to Melitz (2003). This model accounts for the
stylised empirical fact that only the best ﬁrms export (see Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and
Jensen, 1999). Important contributions that build on the Melitz framework include work by Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). Alternative frameworks which account
for ﬁrm heterogeneity in the context of trade are provided by Manasse and Turrini (2001), Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
2While a positive relationship between the level of international outsourcing – which is usually measured
by the share of intermediate goods imports in overall imports or gross production – and inter-group income
inequality is well documented in the empirical trade literature (see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999;
Geishecker and G¨ org, 2008), the link between intermediate goods imports and intra-group inequality has
so far not been the focus of rigorous empirical analysis. This is surprising because the respective time
patterns of the two phenomena suggest not only that this link may exist, but also that it may well be the
most important channel through which economic integration aﬀects income inequality.
2have been explored in the trade literature. The ﬁrst is to consider a model where iden-
tical individuals perform diﬀerent tasks in equilibrium. A setup of this type naturally
generates intra-group income inequality if wages are task speciﬁc (Davidson, Matusz and
Shevchenko, 2008). A second modelling strategy, and the one we are pursuing in the
present paper, focuses on heterogeneity of ﬁrm characteristics and introduces a mechanism
by which this heterogeneity translates into ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages.3 In previous contributions
to this literature, inter-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials have been determined by exogenous diﬀer-
ences between ﬁrms in their monitoring technology (Davis and Harrigan, 2007) and their
productivity (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007), respectively. In the present paper, we model
wages at the ﬁrm level as depending positively on operating proﬁts (which are, of course,
themselves endogenous). There is strong empirical support for the idea that larger, more
productive ﬁrms, which are also the ﬁrms that export, pay higher wages (Bernard and
Jensen, 1995, 1999).4 A positive relationship between ﬁrm size and wage payments is also
well documented in the empirical labour economics literature. Blanchﬂower, Oswald and
Sanfey (1996) and Bayard and Troske (1999) ﬁnd this relationship using U.S. data and
rigorously controlling for individual and job characteristics. More recently, Faggio, Sal-
vanes and Van Reenen (2007) utilise panel data for the UK to show that ﬁrm productivity
is a key determinant of individual wage inequality. The present model is compatible with
these stylised facts since larger, more productive ﬁrms have higher operating proﬁts as
well.
Firm heterogeneity in our framework results from heterogeneous abilities of entrepre-
neurs. One entrepreneur, who acts as owner-manager, is needed to run each ﬁrm. Firms
run by more able entrepreneurs are more productive, leading to higher operating proﬁts
3Outside the ﬁeld of international trade, a complementary approach to modelling intra-group wage
inequality has focused on unobservable heterogeneity of individual characteristics like learning abilities
(Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002).
4In a recent empirical study, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) conﬁrm that ﬁrm characteristics
are an important explanatory variable for individual wage inequality. Using a large set of linked em-
ployer–employee data from Germany, they show that a wage premium of exporters exists even if one
controls for observable and unobservable characteristics of both individuals and the workplace.
3and thus to higher incomes for the respective entrepreneurs. We enrich this basic model
structure and account for labour market imperfection, which we introduce by means of a
fair wage-eﬀort mechanism in the spirit of Akerlof and Yellen (1990).5 Workers’ fair wage
preferences lead to rent-sharing at the ﬁrm level: More able entrepreneurs, running ﬁrms
with higher operating proﬁts, have to pay their production workers higher wages in order
to elicit full eﬀort.
Taking stock, our model features income inequality along three dimensions. First, there
is income inequality between diﬀerent groups of individuals – entrepreneurs and production
workers – that is determined by the ratio between the respective average incomes. Second,
there is income inequality among entrepreneurs of diﬀering abilities. And third, there is
intra-group wage inequality among ex ante identical workers due to the fair wage-eﬀort
mechanism. Beyond that our model also features involuntary unemployment because
the fair wage mechanism prevents wages from falling to the market clearing level. This
contributes to the comprehensive picture of inequality as the unemployed typically receive
a transfer payment which is lower than the income they could achieve if their abilities
were used productively. In the model this payment is set equal to zero.
With regard to the determinants of inequality, we ﬁrst look at the closed economy and
analyse the role of fairness considerations, which are the source of labour market imper-
fection in our model. Thereby, we ﬁnd that the more important the rent sharing motive is
in workers’ fair wage preferences, the smaller is the diﬀerence between the average income
of entrepreneurs and the average income of production workers, and the less pronounced
is the income inequality within the group of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, income
inequality within the group of unskilled workers increases. Average productivity decreases,
with adverse consequences for total output and aggregate employment.
With regard to the open economy, we make the standard assumption that there are
ﬁxed costs of exporting, and as a consequence not all ﬁrms ﬁnd exporting worthwhile.
5There is considerable empirical support for a mechanism of this type, as illustrated in the review
articles by Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2005). Both stress the wide extent and the strength of evidence
from a range of sources that support the fair wage model. These sources include surveys of managers and
workers, ﬁrm-level studies of pay and termination patterns, and experiments.
4International trade has two diﬀerent selection eﬀects: There is a self selection of the high
productivity ﬁrms into export status, while at the other end of the productivity distrib-
ution ﬁrms shut down as the least able entrepreneurs realise better income opportunities
elsewhere, e.g. by supplying their labour as production workers. This leads to an increase
in aggregate unemployment and higher inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as
well as within the groups of entrepreneurs and workers, respectively.
There are several contributions to the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature that look at the
trade-inequality nexus which is also in the centre of this paper’s interest. However, among
these studies, Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008) is the only one that considers, as
we do, both inter- and intra-group income inequality in an integrated framework. In their
search and matching model with skilled and unskilled workers, and high- and low-tech
ﬁrms, unskilled workers are matched with low-tech ﬁrms, while skilled workers can be
matched with either high- or low-tech ﬁrms. Incomes of skilled workers are task-speciﬁc,
i.e. they depend on the production technology used by their employer, and globalisation
aﬀects both the relative income of skilled workers in high- and low-tech ﬁrms and the
relative income of skilled and unskilled workers.
Furthermore, there are some contributions that emphasise certain aspects of income
inequality. Among them, there are three papers that address the eﬀects of globalisation
on the skill premium in a heterogeneous ﬁrm framework, while being silent on intra-
group wage inequality. The paper closest to ours is Manasse and Turrini (2001). In their
model, as in ours, each ﬁrm is run by an entrepreneur (“skilled worker”) who has to hire
homogenous unskilled (“raw”) labour for the actual production process. The market for
unskilled labour is assumed perfectly competitive, and therefore unskilled workers are paid
the same wage in all ﬁrms.6 In Yeaple (2005), heterogeneous labour is the only factor of
6In addition, the number of ﬁrms, while endogenous in our model, is exogenous in Manasse and Turrini.
As a direct consequence of this diﬀerence, globalisation has opposite eﬀects on inter-group income inequality
in the two models: While the relative income of entrepreneurs increases in our model, it falls in Manasse
and Turrini (2001). See Meckl and Weigert (2007) for a contribution that endogenises the number of ﬁrms
in a model of the Manasse-Turrini type with a distortion-free labour market. Their paper does not look
at inequality but focuses on the question of skill formation.
5production, and globalisation aﬀects the inequality between workers of diﬀering skill levels.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) extend the heterogeneous ﬁrm model of Melitz (2003)
to a two-sector, two-factor framework, and globalisation in their model has an eﬀect on
the relative return of the two factors of production.
Complementary to these papers, the models of Davis and Harrigan (2007) and Egger
and Kreickemeier (2007) feature wage diﬀerences between identical workers in a Melitz-
type framework, but – with only one homogenous factor of production – are silent by
construction on inter-group inequality between diﬀerent groups of individuals (skilled and
unskilled workers, or as in our case, workers and entrepreneurs). While both models are
equipped in principle to discuss intra-group wage inequality, the analysis does not focus
on sophisticated measures of income inequality but on other aspects of globalisation, like
employment eﬀects and the possible destruction of good jobs that oﬀer high income oppor-
tunities for workers. Furthermore, while these papers emphasise one important channel
through which trade liberalisation can inﬂuence intra-group wage inequality, namely ﬁrm
selection, they do not account for another important channel, which is more closely related
to the idea of rent sharing: With inter-ﬁrm wage inequality due to diﬀerences in exogenous
parameters (monitoring technology or productivities, see above), these papers cannot dis-
cuss how trade liberalisation aﬀects the wage proﬁle, i.e. the relative wage paid by any two
active ﬁrms, because this ratio is exogenous by construction. In our framework, wages are
linked to ﬁrm proﬁts, due to a rent-sharing motive of workers. Hence, trade liberalisation
inﬂuences the wage proﬁle as it aﬀects ﬁrm proﬁts asymmetrically.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the closed
economy version of our model. Section 3 analyses the eﬀects of international trade on the
key variables of interest: welfare, unemployment and intra- as well as inter-group wage
inequality. Section 4 concludes.
2 Fair Wages and Firm Heterogeneity in a Closed Economy
Consider an economy with a population of mass N. Two types of goods are produced:
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and homogeneous ﬁnal output.
62.1 The Final Goods Sector








, 0 < ρ < 1, (1)
with the measure of set V representing the mass of available intermediate goods M. In the
(hypothetical) case where the ﬁnal goods sector used an equal quantity q of all intermediate
inputs, the production technology in (1) would yield Y = Mq, and hence increasing M
for a given aggregate level of input would not increase aggregate output.7
We take ﬁnal output as the num´ eraire and assume perfect competition in the ﬁnal










with σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) being the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent varieties of
intermediate goods. Due to the choice of num´ eraire, we have P = 1. Using this normal-
isation, proﬁt maximisation of competitive ﬁnal goods producers leads to the following





2.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
At the intermediate goods level, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms, each producing a unique variety. Hence, the mass of intermediate goods producers
equals M, the mass of varieties utilised by the ﬁnal goods sector. When entering the
market, each ﬁrm must set up its own distribution system, bearing a ﬁxed cost sf, where
f is the quantity of distribution services used, and s is the fee paid per unit. Once ﬁxed
7Using technology (1) instead of the traditional Ethier (1982) technology, which features external scale
economies, is attractive for two reasons. On the one hand, we avoid a negative relationship between country
size and the unemployment rate, which would be counterfactual. And, on the other hand, we exclude trade
eﬀects that are merely driven by an increase in market size and are well understood for a long time. See
Egger and Kreickemeier (2007) and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2007) for further discussion.
7cost sf is incurred, output at the ﬁrm level q is linear in labour input l and depends on





with w(φ) denoting the wage paid to a physical unit of labour (a worker) in a ﬁrm with
productivity φ, and ε being the eﬀort level provided by workers. Hence, w(φ)/(φε) is the
marginal cost of a ﬁrm with productivity level φ, and the price is a constant markup 1/ρ










Furthermore, operating and total proﬁts are given by r(φ)/σ and π(φ) = r(φ)/σ − sf,
respectively.
Each ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector is run by an entrepreneur, who acts as
owner-manager of the ﬁrm. For the decision to become an entrepreneur, the individual-
speciﬁc entrepreneurial ability as well as the available alternative income possibilities are
relevant. Entrepreneurial ability φ is distributed according to a distribution function
G(φ) with density g(φ), and a ﬁrm run by a more able entrepreneur has a higher labour
productivity. For simplicity we assume that labour productivity in any given ﬁrm is equal
to the entrepreneurial ability of its owner, and it can therefore be represented by the same
variable, φ. As is shown below, proﬁts at the ﬁrm level π(φ) are increasing in a ﬁrm’s
productivity level, implying that an individual with a higher entrepreneurial ability can
realise higher income as a ﬁrm owner.
If an individual decides against becoming an entrepreneur he can choose between two
alternative activities. On the one hand, he can become self-employed, supplying one unit
of distribution services at fee s. On the other hand, he can oﬀer one unit of labour in
the market for production workers. In neither role can the individual make productive
use of his entrepreneurial ability. However, there is an important diﬀerence between these
two alternative choices. While the market for services is perfectly competitive, leading to
identical income streams of all service suppliers, the remuneration of production workers
8is uncertain because wages diﬀer across ﬁrms and not all production workers actually ﬁnd
a job, due to labour market imperfections. The expected wage of a production worker is
(1 − U) ¯ w, with U being the unemployment rate of workers, and ¯ w the average wage of
those who are employed.8
Individuals have to commit themselves to one of the three roles and cannot reverse
their choices after entrepreneurs have made their investment and hiring decisions.9 In
equilibrium, it has to be true that expected income from all three activities is the same.
This implies
π(φ∗) = s = (1 − U) ¯ w, (6)
where φ∗ denotes ability of the marginal entrepreneur (i.e. the cutoﬀ ability level). All
variables in (6) are determined in general equilibrium.
2.3 A Model of Inter-Firm Wage Diﬀerentiation
The labour market in our model is characterised by a variant of the fair-wage eﬀort mech-
anism identiﬁed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Workers have a preference for fairness and
condition their eﬀort ε on the wage they are paid relative to the wage they consider to
be fair, ˆ w. If ﬁrms pay at least ˆ w, workers provide the normal level of eﬀort, which, for
notational simplicity, is set equal to one. Eﬀort decreases proportionally if the actual wage
w falls short of ˆ w. Formally, we have ε = min(w/ ˆ w,1). Due to w/ε = ˆ w ∀w ≤ ˆ w, proﬁt
maximising ﬁrms have no incentive to pay less than ˆ w, so that we can safely follow Akerlof
8Accounting for service provision as a third type of activity is not essential for our results. However, it
allows in the simplest possible way to preserve in our framework one attractive feature that is present in
any Melitz-type model: identical ﬁxed costs across ﬁrms (with the same exporting status). Melitz (2003)
assumed that the ﬁxed input is provided by production workers. As noted by Egger and Kreickemeier
(2007), this assumption is less attractive in a framework with ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages, because ﬁrms would
then diﬀer in both their ﬁxed and their variable production costs. This in turn would make it diﬃcult to
disentangle the channels through which ﬁrm heterogeneity inﬂuences aggregate outcomes. For that reason,
it is convenient to choose a diﬀerent source for the provision of the ﬁxed input.
9This is a standard assumption in a setting with certain and uncertain income streams (see e.g. Helpman
and Itskhoki, 2007).
9and Yellen (1990) in assuming that ﬁrms set wages at least as high as ˆ w. It is shown below
that each ﬁrm can hire the proﬁt maximising number of workers if they set w = ˆ w, so this
is what they do in equilibrium.
A key issue in this line of research is how to determine the fair wage. Fehr and
G¨ achter (2000) point out that the idea of gift exchange, which underlies the fair wage-
eﬀort hypothesis, implies that ﬁrms that make higher proﬁts pay higher wages as well. In
order to build a model that takes this observation seriously, we need two ingredients: (i)
ﬁrms that make diﬀerent proﬁts in equilibrium, and (ii) workers that consider proﬁts of
the ﬁrm they are employed by as a determinant of their fair wage. At this point, we focus
on (ii), and – as far as (i) is concerned – simply postulate that in equilibrium ﬁrms diﬀer
in the proﬁts they are making, deferring the derivation of this result to section 2.4.
In line with most of the existing literature on the fairness approach to eﬃciency wages,
we assume that the fair wage is a weighted average of two factors, one being ﬁrm-internal
and the other one being related to market forces. Similar to Kreickemeier and Nelson
(2006), we associate the second component with the expected labour income per worker:
(1 − U) ¯ w. The ﬁrm-internal component in determining the reference wage are operating






[(1 − U) ¯ w]1−θ, (7)
where θ ∈ [0,1] can be interpreted as a rent-sharing parameter. Taking into account
ˆ w(φ) = w(φ), the fair wage speciﬁcation in (7) gives rise to identical wages in all ﬁrms if
θ = 0 (cf. Melitz, 2003), while wages are ﬁrm-speciﬁc if θ > 0.11
10Total proﬁts would be an alternative to operating proﬁts as the ﬁrm-internal component of the reference
wage. The key mechanisms of our analysis do not depend on which of these measures of ﬁrm success is used,
and choosing operating proﬁts makes the model much more tractable. Danthine and Kurmann (2006) use
a diﬀerent ﬁrm-internal component and make the reference wage dependent on output per worker within a
ﬁrm. While acknowledging the potential role of a ﬁrm internal reference point, their model does not allow
for ﬁrm heterogeneity, implying that all ﬁrms within a sector pay the same wage.
11The fair wage approach to eﬃciency wages should be interpreted as a two-stage process, with ﬁrms
oﬀering a wage at stage one and workers deciding upon their eﬀort level at stage two. Since it is not
possible to write a binding contract on the eﬀort of workers prior to the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer, ﬁrms have no
102.4 Firm Distribution and Average Productivity
Relative revenues (or operating proﬁts) and wages of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities






































By virtue of (3) and (10), more productive ﬁrms charge lower prices and realise a higher
output level. Furthermore, it follows from (8) and (9), that they make higher proﬁts and
therefore pay higher wages, due to the fair-wage eﬀort mechanism set out in section 2.3.
We can now determine a weighted average of productivity levels ˜ φ which is deﬁned in a
way to ensure that the quantity q(˜ φ) is equal to the average output per ﬁrm, Y/M. From








where 1 − G(φ∗) is the share of individuals with an entrepreneurial ability φ ≥ φ∗. Using














We use the Pareto distribution to parametrise G(φ):
G(φ) = 1 − φ−k g(φ) = kφ−(k+1), (12)
incentive to replace their workers by outsiders who declare they would be willing to work for a lower wage.
The reason is that the wage considered fair by workers is ﬁrm-speciﬁc (see eq. (7)). This means that
workers adjust their perception of a fair treatment (and thus the fair wage) to the (expected) operating
proﬁts of the ﬁrm they are working in. Fehr and Falk (1999) provide strong support for a mechanism of
this type from laboratory experiments.
11where the lower bound of productivities is normalised to 1 without loss of generality (i.e.
φ ≥ 1), and k is a strictly positive parameter.12 Substituting for G(φ∗) and g(φ) in (11)







In order to ensure a well deﬁned average productivity for all admissible values of θ, we
assume k > σ − 1 henceforth.
Denoting by ¯ R aggregate revenues in this economy and by ¯ Π aggregate proﬁts we ﬁnd –
analogous to Melitz (2003) – that ¯ R = Mr(˜ φ) and ¯ Π = Mπ(˜ φ). Together with the previous
results P = p(˜ φ) = 1 and (by deﬁnition) Y = Mq(˜ φ), this illustrates the usefulness of
the particular average deﬁned in (11): The aggregate product market variables in our
model are identical to what they would be if the economy hosted M identical ﬁrms with
productivity ˜ φ.
2.5 Equilibrium Factor Allocation
The resource constraint (RC) of the economy is given by:
L = N − (1 + f)M, (14)
with L denoting the supply of production workers. RC is downward sloping in M − L
space as a higher number of ﬁrms, along with the individuals hired to provide distribution
services for each ﬁrm, leaves fewer individuals for the labour supply.
A second relation between L and M can be derived by rewriting equilibrium condition








12Using ﬁrm level data for eleven European countries, Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) show that
“Pareto is a fairly good approximation” (p. 17) of the productivity distribution in their data set. Due
to its empirical support and its attractive features in terms of analytical tractability, the assumption of
a Pareto distribution is by now common in the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms. Prominent examples
include Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
12The left hand side is the proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm, i.e. the income of the entrepreneur with
cutoﬀ ability level φ∗. As shown in eq. (60) it is a constant fraction of r(˜ φ), the revenues
of the average ﬁrm. The right hand side equals the labour income per capita, as with
markup pricing ρ equals the labour share of aggregate income. Substituting Y = Mr(˜ φ)
and using ρ = 1 − 1/σ we obtain the labour indiﬀerence condition (LI)
L =
k(σ − 1)(1 + f)
k − ξ
M. (15)
Intuitively, for a given aggregate output a higher number of ﬁrms M would imply a lower
revenue of the average ﬁrm r(˜ φ), and consequently a lower proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm. In
order to restore indiﬀerence of the marginal entrepreneur between running the ﬁrm and
not doing so, the expected wage (which is proportional to aggregate output per worker)
has to fall as well. Holding Y constant, this requires an increase in labour supply L.
Hence, LI is upward sloping in M − L space.
The cutoﬀ ability in our model is implicitly given by the relation M = [1 − G(φ∗)]N,








Figure 1 plots eqs. (14), (15) and (16). The equilibrium values of L and M are determined
by RC and LI in the right quadrant, and the implied value of φ∗ can be read oﬀ the cutoﬀ
















It is immediate from eqs. (17) to (19) that an increase in rent sharing parameter θ increases
M, while reducing L and φ∗. Hence, a stronger rent-sharing motive of workers increases
the number of entrepreneurs (or, equivalently, the number of ﬁrms). The logic is as




















Figure 1: Equilibrium in the closed economy
wages, thereby giving a relative advantage, ceteris paribus, to less productive ﬁrms (less
able entrepreneurs). The impact of θ on M, L and φ∗ can also be seen in ﬁgure 1,
where an increase in θ rotates the LI locus counter-clockwise, leaving the other two curves
unaﬀected.
2.6 Welfare and Unemployment
In our model with a single homogeneous ﬁnal good, per capita income Y/N is the natural
utilitarian welfare measure. Since we have already derived the proportion of workers in the
population, L/N, in eq. (17), we now turn to deriving the output per worker, Y/L. The fair
wage constraint for the ﬁrm with average productivity equals w(˜ φ) = (r(˜ φ)/σ)θ(ρY/L)1−θ.
Substitution from eq. (60) yields







14and hence the wage of the average ﬁrm is proportional to the income per worker. Com-




















where ˜ φ is determined by eqs. (13) and (19). Hence, all other things equal welfare increases
proportionally with the productivity of the average ﬁrm.
To determine the equilibrium unemployment rate, we can use the adding-up condition
that aggregate employment has to equal the sum of the employment levels of all ﬁrms:






Accounting for Ml(˜ φ) = Mq(˜ φ)/˜ φ = Y/˜ φ and using eq. (21), this can be rewritten as




θ k − ξ
k − (1 − θ)ξ
. (23)
There is full employment if the wage considered to be fair by workers does not hinge on
the operating proﬁt of the ﬁrm they are working in, i.e. U = 0 if θ = 0. In the case of
interest, namely θ > 0, we get U ∈ (0,1).
With eqs. (22) and (23) at hand, we can now look at the comparative-static eﬀects of
a change in the rent-sharing parameter θ on welfare and unemployment. The respective
results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in θ lowers per capita income Y/N and increases the unem-
ployment rate U.
Proof. See Appendix
There are counteracting eﬀects of a θ increase on the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Holding aggregate variables constant, an increase in the rent-sharing parameter raises the
reference wage of all workers, according to (7), and even more so in the more productive
15ﬁrms, thereby initially reducing employment in all ﬁrms. This employment reduction low-
ers aggregate labour income and therefore works against the direct eﬀect of a θ increase
on the reference wage. For the least productive ﬁrms, it is the indirect eﬀect that dom-
inates, thereby triggering ﬁrm entry at the bottom end of the ability distribution. As
noted in section 2.5 this lowers labour supply L. For the most productive ﬁrms, however,
it is the direct eﬀect that dominates, implying a destruction of the “good jobs” that pay
high wages (Davis and Harrigan, 2007). Overall, employment loss in the most productive
ﬁrms is not fully compensated by additional employment in the least productive ﬁrms
(including the new entrants), and aggregate employment falls by more than the labour
supply, leading to an increase in U. Aggregate output falls due to both the decrease in
aggregate employment and the shift in employment towards less productive ﬁrms. As a
consequence, per capita income Y/N unambiguously falls after a θ increase.
2.7 Income Distribution
After deriving aggregate measures to characterise the equilibrium in the closed economy,
we now turn to characterising the income distribution. There is more than one way of
looking at this question, considering that we have three groups of people in the economy
(entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and workers), and that there is income inequality
within the group of entrepreneurs and within the group of workers. As the focus of most
existing studies is on inter-group inequality (see Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007, for
a recent contribution in the context of heterogeneous ﬁrms), we ﬁrst consider the ratio of
average entrepreneurial income ¯ π and the average income of workers (1 − U) ¯ w, with the
latter being equal to service fee s. This ratio is given by13
¯ π





13Note that aggregate proﬁts are given by ¯ Π = M
h
r(˜ φ)/σ − f(1 − U) ¯ w
i
, while average proﬁts equal
¯ π = ¯ Π/M. Accounting for (1−U) ¯ w = r(φ
∗)/[σ(1+f)] and r(˜ φ)/r(φ
?) = k/(k−ξ), one can easily calculate
(24).
16Note that ω(ξ) > 1.14 This is intuitive as average proﬁts ¯ π are higher than proﬁts of
the least productive ﬁrms π(φ∗), while the marginal entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between
setting up a ﬁrm or supplying its labour in the market for production workers, i.e. π(φ∗) =
(1 − U) ¯ w, according to (6).
To determine intra-group inequality, we calculate the Gini coeﬃcients for entrepre-
neurial and labour income.15 As it is shown in detail in the Appendix, the Gini coeﬃcient
for the group of entrepreneurs is given by
AM =
kξ(1 + f)
(k + ξf)(2k − ξ)
(25)
while the Gini coeﬃcient for (employed) production workers is given by
AL =
θξ
2(k − ξ) + θξ
. (26)
Comparing (25) and (26), we obtain AM > AL, so that the inequality of entrepreneurial
income is more pronounced than the inequality of labour income, according to the Gini
criterion.16
14Combining (23) and (24) we can determine ¯ π/ ¯ w = [1/(1+f)]
θ(k +fξ)/[k −(1−θ)ξ] as an alternative
measure of inter-group income inequality. However, as (1 − U) ¯ w is the relevant criterion when deciding
upon setting up a ﬁrm, we choose the ratio in (24) as our preferred measure of inter-group inequality.
15The Gini coeﬃcient is a widely used measure for inequality. It is given by A = 1 − 2
R 1
0 Q(γ)dγ,
with Q(γ) being the Lorenz curve, which determines the share of (proﬁt or labour) income attributed
to the bottom γ percent of individuals in the reference group (entrepreneurs or employed workers). Put
diﬀerently, the Gini coeﬃcient describes the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal in a Lorenz
diagram (multiplied by 2). It takes a value between 0 and 1, with higher values of A reﬂecting higher
inequality.
16In a robustness analysis, we have grouped together entrepreneurs and self-employed service providers
to obtain an inequality measure for the “independent civilian labour force”. However, as the respective
Gini calculations for income inequality of this somewhat more comprehensive group of individuals did
not provide any additional insights, we do not discuss them here. Furthermore, since accounting for
unemployed workers (who earn zero income) would not change our results, we exclude them from the
analysis when calculating the Gini coeﬃcient for labour income. Ignoring self-employed and unemployed
individuals when talking about intra-group inequality implies that the Lorenz curves, underlying the Gini
coeﬃcients in (25) and (26), are strictly increasing and strictly convex functions in the respective Lorenz
diagrams.
17With equations (24)-(26) at hand, we can now determine the impact of an increase
in rent-sharing parameter θ on income inequality. The results are summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in θ lowers both inter-group inequality ω(ξ) and the Gini
coeﬃcient for entrepreneurial income AM. An increase in θ increases the Gini coeﬃcient
for labour income AL.
Proof. See Appendix.
A higher θ increases the weight of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in the wage considered to
be fair by workers (see (7)). This raises the variable production costs of more productive
ﬁrms relative to their less productive competitors. As a consequence, the diﬀerential of
revenues in (9) declines and so does proﬁt inequality AM. Furthermore, with the expected
income of production workers being linked to the income of the marginal entrepreneur,
according to indiﬀerence condition (6), the decline in proﬁt inequality AM induces a fall
in inter-group inequality ω(ξ). A higher weight of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in the
reference wage of workers tends to increase the inequality of labour income. This eﬀect
is reinforced by the entry of less productive ﬁrms. However, there is also a counteracting
eﬀect, as an increase in the variable production costs of more productive ﬁrms relative
to their less productive competitors lowers the market share (and thus the employment
share) of these ﬁrms. All other things equal, this tends to reduce income inequality of
production workers. The latter eﬀect is dominated by the ﬁrst two ones, however, so that
the Gini coeﬃcient for labour income goes up. By striving harder to get their fair share
of ﬁrms’ proﬁts, workers therefore increase inequality within their group. This completes
our discussion of the autarky scenario.
3 The Open Economy
We now look at the trade equilibrium in a world of two identical countries. As in the
standard Melitz model, there are two types of trade costs: variable transport costs of the
iceberg type, represented by parameter τ > 1, and ﬁxed export costs. Fixed export costs
18are associated with the necessity of a local distribution system in the foreign economy.
The required amount of fx units of service inputs is again contracted to self-employed
individuals. Because these individuals have the choice between working for either type of
ﬁrm (exporter or non-exporter), their remuneration in either role has to be the same in
equilibrium, and ﬁxed export costs become sfx.
3.1 Partitioning of Firms by Export Status
The analysis focuses on the empirically relevant case where not all ﬁrms are exporters, and
hence there is self-selection of ﬁrms into export status. In order to ﬁnd the exact condition
for this to hold in equilibrium, we have to take into account that with the speciﬁcation of
the fair wage constraint in eq. (7) a ﬁrm with higher operating proﬁts has to pay a higher
wage, and hence an exporter pays higher wages than a non-exporter ceteris paribus.
This implies that in the open economy the revenue diﬀerential between two ﬁrms does
not only depend on their relative productivity levels but also on their respective export
status. We therefore have to distinguish between domestic revenues of exporters and non-
exporters. With the former serving consumers in more than one market and the latter
serving only domestic consumers (and thus being active in one market), we use superscripts
m and o, respectively, to indicate revenues of these two ﬁrm types. In the case of exporting
ﬁrms, we also have to distinguish between revenues associated with domestic and foreign
sales, using subscript x to denote the latter. For an exporting ﬁrm with productivity
level φ and revenues in its home market of rm(φ), revenues from exporting are given by
rm
x (φ) = τ1−σrm(φ).
In analogy to eq. (8), the home market revenue diﬀerential of two ﬁrms that have
















Both equations can be solved to give
rm
ro = (1 + τ1−σ)−θξ < 1. (27)
19Hence, a ﬁrm of a given productivity has lower revenue in its home market if it chooses
to become an exporter because the higher operating proﬁts that exporting entails lead to
higher wages via the fair wage constraint, and therefore higher marginal cost. The relative
gross gain from exporting (RGE) of a ﬁrm with productivity φ is then given by
(1 + τ1−σ)rm(φ) − ro(φ)
ro(φ)
= (1 + τ1−σ)
ξ











Figure 2: Determination of domestic and export cutoﬀ productivities
The relative costs of entering the export market (RCE), also measured as a proportion
of a non-exporter’s operating proﬁts, are given by sfxσ/ro(φ). Figure 2 shows the RGE
and RCE loci, and the marginal exporter with productivity φ∗
x is found at the intersection
of the two loci. Using eq. (6) to substitute for s, we ﬁnd that for the marginal ﬁrm, i.e. the
ﬁrm with productivity φ∗, RCE equals fx/(1 + f), and hence the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the export selection eﬀect to be present is given by
fx
1 + f
> (1 + τ1−σ)
ξ
σ−1 − 1. (29)
It is assumed throughout that this condition holds.
203.2 The Share of Exporters and Average Productivity
Figure 2 does not allow us to pin down the two cutoﬀ levels φ∗ and φ∗
x explicitly, because
s – and therefore the position of the RCE locus – is not yet determined. However, we can
still derive the fraction of ﬁrms that export χ, which depends only on the ratio of the two
cutoﬀ levels: As the mass of exporting ﬁrms and the mass of all ﬁrms are given by 1−G(φ∗
x)
and 1 − G(φ∗), respectively, with the assumption of Pareto-distributed productivities it
follows that χ = [1−G(φ∗
x)]/[1−G(φ∗)] = (φ∗/φ∗











= s(1 + f),
where the ﬁrst expression states that the additional operating proﬁts the marginal export-
ing ﬁrm makes under exporting have to equal the ﬁxed exporting cost, and the second
expression is just a rewritten version of the indiﬀerence condition (6) for the marginal entre-
preneur. Lastly, in analogy to eq. (9) we can relate the relative productivities of the ﬁrms at
the two cutoﬀs to their relative operating proﬁts (or revenues): (φ∗/φ∗
x)ξ = ro(φ∗)/ro(φ∗
x).

















and one can immediately see that χ is strictly decreasing in both τ and fx, as can be
expected. With both countries being symmetric, the total number of producers selling to
one market is given by Mt = M(1 + χ).
It was shown above that for the closed economy we can look at a ﬁrm with average
productivity ˜ φa(subscript a is used henceforth to denote autarky values) when determining
aggregate variables. In the open economy with self-selection of ﬁrms into export status
it is useful to distinguish between two average productivities that use diﬀerent weights
in the aggregation of ﬁrm productivities. We denote by ˜ φ the average productivity of
domestic ﬁrms using (hypothetical) output shares that would result if ﬁrms were paying
wages that reﬂect their domestic (rather than total) operating proﬁts. While these output
shares are not actually observed in the open economy, the average is still very useful
because it is proportional to the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ according to eq. (13). We also
21deﬁne a weighted productivity average of all ﬁrms selling in a particular market, ˜ φt. This
productivity accounts for the fact that exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters and
that international trade involves transportation costs. In analogy to the closed economy,
we formulate ˜ φt in a way to ensure qo(˜ φt) = Y/Mt, i.e. the quantity produced by the
average ﬁrm for its domestic market – provided this ﬁrm is a non-exporter – equals the
average output per ﬁrm selling to this market.17 In analogy to the average productivity
in the closed economy ˜ φa, the deﬁnition of ˜ φt furthermore implies P = po(˜ φt) = 1 and
Y = ¯ R = Mtro(˜ φt). Hence, for the determination of aggregate product market variables
in the open economy version of the model ˜ φt assumes the role that ˜ φa has for the closed
economy.
It is shown in the appendix that ˜ φt and ˜ φ are related by







where ∆ ≡ (1+f+χfx)/(1+f) is the ratio of ﬁxed resource requirements of the respective
average ﬁrms under trade and autarky. In general it is ambiguous which of the two average
productivities is larger. There are three eﬀects that determine their relative size, and they
work in opposite directions. The export selection eﬀect increases ˜ φt, ceteris paribus, as only
the most productive foreign ﬁrms export, thereby increasing the share of high productivity
ﬁrms in the average. The remaining two eﬀects both work to decrease ˜ φt relative to ˜ φ:
The lost in transit eﬀect caused by goods melting away en route reduces the share of
foreign exporters in overall domestic sales. The exporter wage premium eﬀect reduces the
share of foreign and domestic exporters in overall domestic sales, as exporting ﬁrms have
to pay higher wages than non-exporters with the same productivity because their proﬁts
are higher. Both eﬀects lower the average as they reduce the weight of high productivity
ﬁrms. It is immediate from eq. (31) that ˜ φt = ˜ φ if and only if fx = 1 + f. With fx
exceeding 1 + f the export selection eﬀect dominates, and hence we get ˜ φt > ˜ φ, while the
reverse ranking of the two average productivities holds if fx is smaller than 1 + f, and
17This deﬁnition of ˜ φt does not imply that a ﬁrm with productivity ˜ φt is actually a non-exporter. If
this ﬁrm was an exporter, its output in the domestic market would be q
m(˜ φt) < q
o(˜ φt) = Y/Mt due to the
wage premium it would have to pay in this case (see the discussion in section 3.1).
22hence the export selection eﬀect is weakened.
The implied revenue diﬀerential follows from eq. (9) as ro(˜ φt)/ro(˜ φ) = ∆/(1+χ), and
multiplying both sides by M leads to
Mtro(˜ φt) = M∆ro(˜ φ) (32)
The left hand side of eq. (32) equals aggregate output Y in the open economy. It is equal
to the aggregate output of a closed economy with ﬁxed resource requirements which are
a multiple ∆ of the domestic ﬁxed resource requirements, 1 + f. This is intuitive, since
(1+f)∆ equals the average ﬁxed resource requirements (including those for exporting) in
the open economy.
3.3 Equilibrium Factor Allocation
In analogy to the autarky scenario, we can now determine the productivity of the marginal
ﬁrm, φ∗, the mass of entrepreneurs M and the supply of labour L. The resource constraint
for the open economy is given by
RCt: L = N − (1 + f)∆M, (33)
Equilibrium condition (60) from the closed economy equilibrium still holds, with ro(˜ φ)
replacing r(˜ φ). Using Y = M∆ro(˜ φ), the labour indiﬀerence condition for the open
economy can then be written as
LIt: L =
k(σ − 1)(1 + f)∆
k − ξ
M. (34)
The relationship between φ∗ and M is unchanged and given by eq. (16).
All three loci are represented in ﬁgure 3, where the respective loci from the closed
economy are represented by dotted lines. The RC locus rotates counter-clockwise because
in the open economy the ﬁxed resource requirement of ﬁrms is higher on average (by a
factor ∆) due to ﬁxed export costs, and hence for a given number of ﬁrms the number of
available workers decreases. The LI locus on the other hand rotates clockwise: Holding Y





















Figure 3: Equilibrium in the open economy
the average ﬁrm, ro(˜ φ), as foreign ﬁrms with a high productivity level enter the domestic
market in the open economy. This would imply both a lower revenue and a lower proﬁt of
the marginal ﬁrm. In order to restore indiﬀerence of the marginal entrepreneur between
running the ﬁrm and not doing so, the expected wage (proportional to aggregate output
per worker) would have to fall as well. For a given level of Y this requires an increase in
the number of workers L (by a factor ∆).
Together, LIt and RCt allow us to determine L and M, and the resulting value for M

















24By comparison to eqs. (17) to (19) we see that the mass of entrepreneurs shrinks after
opening up to international trade, and therefore the cutoﬀ ability increases. In contrast,
the labour supply stays constant. These eﬀects can be veriﬁed by inspection of ﬁgure 3.
3.4 Welfare and Unemployment
With the results in section 3.3 at hand, we can now turn to determining welfare and
unemployment in the open economy. As under autarky, we use the fair wage constraint
of the average ﬁrm, which now becomes wo(˜ φt) = (ro(˜ φt)/σ)θ(ρY/L)1−θ. Accounting for














where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side equals (˜ φt/˜ φ)
ξ
σ−1 and the second term equals
˜ φ/˜ φa. The employment rate of production workers in the open economy follows from the
adding-up condition:












Proceeding as in the case of the closed economy we arrive at
1 − U =
Γ
∆
(1 − Ua) (39)
with








We can now compare welfare and unemployment in the autarky equilibrium with the
respective values for the open economy. This gives the following result.
Proposition 3. International trade increases the rate of unemployment. Furthermore,
the condition fx ≥ 1 + f is suﬃcient for a positive welfare eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix.
25The intuition for these results is as follows. Considering the welfare eﬀect ﬁrst, we know
from the analysis of the autarky case that, all other things equal, per capita income
Y/N increases with the average productivity of ﬁrms ˜ φa (see (22)). Furthermore, it has
been shown in section 3.3 that international trade renders ﬁrm ownership for the least
productive entrepreneurs unattractive, implying a decline in M and an increase in the
marginal productivity φ∗. This induces an increase in the average productivity of domestic
ﬁrms ˜ φ as deﬁned above. However, as shown above, the average productivity of all ﬁrms
in the market, which is represented by ˜ φt, can be larger or smaller than ˜ φ, depending on
the relative strength of the export-selection, lost-in-transit and exporter-wage-premium
eﬀects, respectively. With fx ≥ 1 + f we have ˜ φt/˜ φ ≥ 1. In this case, international trade
unambiguously increases the average productivity in the market and therefore per capita
income Y/N. In contrast, with fx < 1 + f we have ˜ φt/˜ φ < 1. Hence, while international
trade unambiguously increases ˜ φ, the average productivity in the market and therefore
per capita income may fall if fx/(1 + f) is suﬃciently small.
To provide an intuition for the unemployment eﬀects of trade liberalisation, it is useful
to focus on a parameter constellation with fx = 1 + f, ﬁrst. From above, we know that
per capita income increases in this case. An increase in per capita income, however, is
associated with an increase in the demand for ﬁnal and intermediate goods. All other
things equal, this leads to an increase in the demand for labour, thereby reducing equilib-
rium unemployment. However, the increase in revenues of the most productive ﬁrms leads
to a higher reference wage of workers in these ﬁrms, according to (7), so that the labour
demand increase following the opening up to international trade is weakened by the fair
wage mechanism described in section 2.3. Furthermore, there is an additional counteract-
ing eﬀect, as the increase in the average productivity level implies that less labour input
is needed to produce a given output level. The two latter eﬀects dominate if fx = 1 + f,
so that unemployment unambiguously increases in this case. If fx 6= 1 + f, there are
additional implications, because the combined lost-in-transit and exporter-wage-premium
eﬀects are not equal in absolute value to the export-selection eﬀect. However, these ad-
ditional implications do not reverse the aforementioned outcome, so that unemployment
26also increases if ˜ φt 6= ˜ φ.
Finally, it is possible to go beyond the results derived so far, and make some inference
about the eﬀects of a marginal reduction in either τ or fx on welfare and aggregate
employment. Proposition 3 provides the natural starting point, as it involves a comparison
of the autarky situation, χ = 0, with the situation of an arbitrary χ ∈ (0,1). It follows
then directly that a marginal reduction in either transport cost parameter increases the
unemployment rate and – under the additional assumption fx ≥ 1+f – leads to an increase
in welfare as long as χ, the proportion of ﬁrms that export, is suﬃciently small. However,
the eﬀects of a τ or fx reduction need not be monotonic, i.e. further trade liberalisation
can reduce welfare and/or the rate of unemployment for suﬃciently low levels of transport
cost.
3.5 Income Distribution
Similar to the autarky scenario, we use the ratio between the average proﬁt of domes-
tic ﬁrms, ¯ πt = (1 + χ)ro(˜ φt) − (f + χfx)(1 − U) ¯ w, and the expected labour income of
production workers, (1 − U) ¯ w, as our measure for inter-group inequality. Furthermore,
to determine intra-group inequality of proﬁts and labour income we look at the respec-
tive Gini coeﬃcients. Deferring derivation details to the Appendix, we can note that
inter-group inequality in the open economy is determined by
¯ πt
(1 − U) ¯ w
=
k + ξ(f + χfx)
k − ξ
. (41)
Furthermore, the Gini coeﬃcient for proﬁt income is given by
AM =
kξ(1 + f + χfx) + (k − ξ)ξχfx(1 − χ)
(2k − ξ)[k + ξ(f + χfx)]
, (42)
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 
1 − χ1−ξ/k




L denoting the Gini coeﬃcient for labour income in the autarky scenario. As with
θ = 0 all ﬁrms pay the same wage, it is clear that limθ→0 AL = 0 must hold. A comparison
of eqs. (24) to (26) and (41) to (43) gives the following result.
Proposition 4. International trade increases inter-group inequality as well as intra-group
inequality for both entrepreneurs and workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
For an intuition of the inter-group inequality eﬀect, note ﬁrst that entrepreneurial income
of the marginal producer is linked to the expected (or average) income of production
workers, according to indiﬀerence condition (6). This implies that an increase in per
capita income Y/N (see Proposition 3) translates into a pari passu increase of (1 − U) ¯ w
and πo(φ∗). However, there are additional proﬁt gains for the most productive ﬁrms, due
to exports to the foreign market. As a consequence average proﬁt income including both
exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms rises disproportionally, thereby inducing an increase in
inter-group inequality after the opening up to international trade.
With regard to the impact of trade liberalisation on the Gini coeﬃcient of entrepre-
neurial income, we have to distinguish two counteracting eﬀects. On the one hand, the
exit of the least productive ﬁrms reduces, all other things equal, intra-group inequality
among entrepreneurs. On the other hand, selection of the most productive ﬁrms into
export status raises these ﬁrms’ proﬁts and thus intra-group inequality among entrepre-
neurs. In our setting, it is the second eﬀect that dominates, so that Gini coeﬃcient AM is
unambiguously higher in the open economy. These two sides of the selection eﬀect – exit
of the least productive ﬁrms and exporting of the most productive ones – are also crucial
for an understanding of how opening up to international trade aﬀects the Gini coeﬃcient
for labour income, AL. On the one hand, because the least productive ﬁrms pay the lowest
wages, exit of these ﬁrms lowers inequality of labour income ceteris paribus. On the other
hand, expansion of the most productive ﬁrms due to exports to the foreign market raises
inequality of labour income, since these ﬁrms pay the highest wages. The latter eﬀect is
reinforced by the fair-wage mechanism in (7), as access to the foreign market stimulates
28operating proﬁts and, thereby, induces an increase in the reference wage of workers in
exporting ﬁrms.18
In analogy to the previous section, we can use the results in Proposition 4 to get some
insight into the eﬀects of marginal trade liberalisation on income inequality. In particular,
using the same reasoning as in section 3.4, we can infer that marginal reductions in τ or
fx increase all three measures of income inequality for suﬃciently low values of χ. It is
furthermore possible to show that both types of trade liberalisation exhibit a monotonic
impact on inter-group inequality as long as there is selection of the best ﬁrms into export
status, i.e. χ < 1. On the other hand the impact of trade cost changes on the two Gini
coeﬃcients turns out to be non-monotonic in general.
4 Conclusion
The key objective of this paper is to present an analytically tractable theoretical framework
that allows us to account for the empirical fact that the recent wave of globalisation with
a surge in international outsourcing activities has been accompanied by a surge in both
inter- and intra-group inequality. For this purpose, we build a model in which there is
income inequality between as well as within two key groups of individuals in the economy:
the group of entrepreneurs and the group of production workers. There is self-selection
of individuals into these two groups, and the group of production workers consists of
individuals whose entrepreneurial ability is too low to make it worthwhile for them to run
a ﬁrm. While ﬁrms run by more able entrepreneurs make higher proﬁts, the entrepreneurial
ability of production workers has no bearing on their respective job performance. Still,
wages are diﬀerentiated within the group of production workers because there is rent
18When analysing the inequality eﬀects, we have also shown that a movement from autarky to trade
shifts the Lorenz curve for proﬁt and labour income downwards in the respective Lorenz curve diagrams.
This implies that, even according the relatively strict criterion of Lorenz dominance, both labour and
entrepreneurial income are less even distributed in the open economy. However, in the interest brevity, we
have deferred a rigorous analysis of the Lorenz curve eﬀects to a supplement, which is available from the
authors upon request.
29sharing at the ﬁrm level due to fairness preferences of workers, leading to higher wages for
employees in ﬁrms with higher operating proﬁts.
Comparing the autarky scenario with the open economy case, we ﬁnd that while,
subject to only mild restrictions, per capita income increases and hence there are typically
aggregate gains from trade, not all individuals participate in these gains to an equal extent.
For one, trade liberalisation increases unemployment among production workers, and those
workers who lose their job are deﬁnitely worse oﬀ in the open economy. Furthermore,
average inequality between the group of entrepreneurs and the group of workers increases,
because entrepreneurs gain disproportionately. Even within these groups there are notable
diﬀerences in the gains from trade liberalisation: the most able entrepreneurs see their
incomes soar, and this eﬀect is instrumental to an increase of income inequality within the
group of entrepreneurs. The income distribution of employed production workers becomes
more unequal as well, as the employees in the high-productivity ﬁrms participate in the
economic success of their employers.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1










































Second, diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to θ gives
d(1 − U)
dθ
= (1 − U)

−ln(1 + f) +
ξ [θkξ − (k − ξ)]
(k − ξ)[k − (1 − θ)ξ]

.
Noting k −ξ > θkξ ⇐⇒ k > σ −1, the term in brackets is strictly negative, and hence we
have d(1 − U)/dθ < 0. This completes the proof. QED.
30Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (25)
A ﬁrst ingredient we need to determine the Gini coeﬃcient for entrepreneurial income is
Π(¯ φ)/¯ Π, which gives the ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all ﬁrms with a productivity level










Now, deﬁne γ ≡ 1 −
 ¯ φ/φ∗−k, where γ is the proportion of all ﬁrms with a productivity











which represents the Lorenz curve. Note that QM(0) = 0, QM(1) = 1 and Q0
M(γ) > 0.
The Gini coeﬃcient in (25) then follows from AM = 1 − 2
R 1
0 QM(γ)dγ. QED.
Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (26)
Aggregate labour income in the economy is given by ¯ W = ρY . As before, we now derive
aggregate labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities up to ¯ φ as a

















We deﬁne γ as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities lower than
or equal to ¯ φ, resulting in γ ≡ 1−
 ¯ φ/φ∗(1−θ)ξ−k. Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗, we arrive at the
following expression for the Lorenz curve:
QL(γ) = 1 − (1 − γ)
k−ξ
k−ξ+θξ.
The Gini coeﬃcient in (26) follows from AL = 1 − 2
R 1
0 QL(γ)dγ. QED.
31Proof of Proposition 2
Consider dξ/dθ = −ξ2 < 0. Then, noting ω0(ξ) = k(1 + f)/(k − ξ)2, according to (24),
implies ω0(ξ) × dξ/dθ < 0. Furthermore, rearranging terms in (25) gives AM = k(1 +
f)/[(k/ξ + f)(2k − ξ)], so that dAM/dξ > 0 and thus dAM/dθ < 0 is immediate. Let
us now rearrange terms in (26), to obtain AL = 1/[2g(θ) + 1], with g(θ) ≡ k/(θξ) − 1/θ.
Substituting θξ = θ(σ −1)/[1+θ(σ −1)], further gives g(θ) = [k −(σ −1)]/[θ(σ −1)]+k,
with g0(θ) >,=,< 0 if σ − 1 >,=,< k. This implies that k > σ − 1 is necessary and
suﬃcient for dAL/dθ > 0, which completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of the Relationship between ˜ φ and ˜ φt in (31)




































Noting that (1 + τ1−σ)[pm(φ)/po(φ)]1−σ = (1 + τ1−σ)rm(φ)/ro(φ) = (1 + τ1−σ)ξ/(σ−1),
according to (4), (5) and (28), and accounting for po(φ)/po(˜ φ) = (φ/˜ φ)−ξ/(σ−1), according











































Finally, deﬁning ˜ φt in a way to ensure po(˜ φt) = 1, which is equivalent to qo(˜ φt) = Y/Mt,
and solving for the productivity average, we arrive at














32which, by virtue of (30), can be reformulated to (31).
Proof of Proposition 3





according to (31), it follows from eqs. (39) and (40) that
U > Ua ⇐⇒
 










> 1 and χ < 1, the following inequality holds:
 









and the right-hand side expression equals fx/(1 + f), according to (30).
Let us now turn to the welfare eﬀects. Accounting for ∆ = (1 + f + χfx)/(1 + f), it










Hence, fx ≥ 1 + f is suﬃcient for (Y/N)/(Y a/N) > 1. This completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of Inter-Group Inequality in (41)
To determine inter-group inequality in the open economy, note ﬁrst that aggregate proﬁts
can be written in the following way: ¯ Πt = M[(1 + χ)ro(˜ φt)/σ − (f + χfx)(1 − U) ¯ w].
Substituting into ¯ πt = ¯ Πt/M and accounting for (1 + χ)ro(˜ φt) = [1 + χfx/(1 + f)]ro(˜ φ),
gives ¯ πt = (1 + f + χfx)ro(˜ φ)/[σ(1 + f)] − (f + χfx)(1 − U) ¯ w. Dividing ¯ πt by (1 − U) ¯ w
and accounting for (1 − U) ¯ w = ro(φ∗)/[σ(1 + f)], we further obtain ¯ πt/[(1 − U) ¯ w] =
(1+f+χfx)ro(˜ φ)/ro(φ∗)−(f+χfx). Substituting ro(˜ φ)/ro(φ∗) = k/(k−ξ) and rearranging
terms, ﬁnally gives (41). QED.
Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (42)
The derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient in the open economy is similar to the respective
derivation under autarky, with the mere diﬀerence that we have to distinguish between
33exporters and non-exporters if trade is possible. The ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all
non-exporters with a productivity level lower than or equal to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗,φ∗
x) and aggregate









Similar to the autarky scenario, we can now deﬁne γ ≡ 1−
 ¯ φ/φ∗−k and rewrite the latter




k + ξ(f + χfx)
h




k + ξ(f + χfx)
.
Note that Q1
M represents the ﬁrst segment of the Lorenz curve, which is relevant if γ ∈
[0,bM), with bM ≡ 1 − (φ∗
x/φ∗)−k = 1 − χ. Evaluating Q1










k − ξf(1 − χ)
k + ξ(f + χfx)
.
The ratio of cumulative proﬁts for all ﬁrms (exporters and non-exporters) with a
productivity level up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗














k(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ
k + ξ(f + χfx)
h
χ1−ξ/k − (1 − γ)1−ξ/k
i
−
(k − ξ)(f + fx)(γ − bM)




M(bM). Putting the two segments together, the Lorenz curve in







M(γ) if γ ∈ [0,bM)
Q2




M(1) = 1 and dQt
M(γ)/dγ > 0. The Gini coeﬃcient in (42) then




34Derivation of the Gini Coeﬃcient in (43)
In the open economy, we have to distinguish between workers employed in non-exporting
and those employed in exporting ﬁrms. Let us ﬁrst determine the ratio between aggregate
labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivity levels up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗,φ∗
x)





















We now deﬁne γ as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities lower
than or equal to ¯ φ, resulting in γ ≡ [1 − (¯ φ/φ∗)(1−θξ−k)]/Γ if ¯ φ < φ∗
x. Note that the γ-φ
relationship determined by the latter expression diﬀers from the respective relationship in
the closed economy, as the most-productive ﬁrms now have access to a foreign market and
therefore increase their employment share. Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗, we obtain the following




1 + f + χfx







L(γ) is the relevant segment, if γ ∈ [0,bL), with bL ≡ [1−(φ∗
x/φ∗)(1−θ)ξ−k]/Γ =
[1 − χ1−(1−θ)ξ/k]/Γ. Evaluating Q1









To determine the ratio between aggregate labour income of workers employed in ﬁrms
with productivity levels up to ¯ φ ∈ [φ∗

















(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ







35With γ being deﬁned as the proportion of workers employed in ﬁrms with productivities
lower than or equal to ¯ φ, we have γ ≡ 1−(1+τ1−σ)(1−θ)ξ/(σ−1)(¯ φ/φ∗)(1−θξ−k)/Γ if ¯ φ ≥ φ∗
x.
Substituting for ¯ φ/φ∗ and considering Q1
L(bL) from above, we arrive at the following
expression for the second segment of the Lorenz curve:
Q2
L(γ) = 1 −
(1 + f)(1 + τ1−σ)1−θξ









L(bL). Putting together the Lorenz curve for labour income in the







L if γ ∈ [0,bL)
Q2
L if γ ∈ [bL,1].
Qt
L has the usual properties: Qt
L(0) = 0, Qt
L(1) = 1 and dQt
L(γ)/dγ > 0. The Gini




Proof of Proposition 4
Denoting autarky equilibrium variables by superscript a, it follows from (24) and (41) that
¯ πt/[(1 − U) ¯ w]





Hence, inter-group inequality is higher in the open economy. Furthermore, comparing eqs.
(25) and (42) we can conclude that
Aa
M >,=,< AM ⇐⇒ 0 >,=,< ξ(k − ξ)χfx[2k + ξf − χ(k + ξf)].
Noting that 2k +ξf > χ(k +ξf) holds for any χ ∈ [0,1], this implies Aa
M < AM and thus
a higher inequality of entrepreneurial income in the open economy.













(1 + τ1−σ)ξ/(σ−1) − 1

(1 + f)χ−ξ/k from (30) and Γ − 1 = [(1 +
τ1−σ)(1−θ)ξ/(σ−1) − 1]χ1−(1−θ)ξ/k from (40), we can further conclude that AL >,=,< 0
36if χ1−ξ/k(1 + f)Ω(χ) >,=,< 0, where
Ω(χ) ≡ (k − ξ)
h




− χθξ/k[k − (1 − θ)ξ]
h





Noting Ω0(χ) < 0 and Ω(1) = 0, we obtain Ω(χ) > 0 and thus AL > Aa
L for any χ ∈ (0,1).
This completes the proof of Proposition 4 . QED.
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